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I.  INTRODUCTION 
According to the 2004-2005 United States Census Bureau Statistical Abstract of 
the United States, Americans identify with at least thirty-five different self-described 
Christian religious groups.1  Of those Christian groups, there are at least four that 
have special tenets regarding medical treatment that are central to their religious 
                                                                
+Winner of the Journal of Law and Health’s Best Note Award, 2006. 
1U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 2004-2005, NO. 
67, SELF-DESCRIBED RELIGIOUS IDENTIFICATION OF ADULT POPULATION: 1990 AND 2001 55 
(2005), available at  http://www.census.gov/prod/2004pubs/04statab/pop.pdf. 
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beliefs.  Together, members of the Jehovah’s Witnesses, Church of God, Pentecostal 
Free Will Baptist Church, and Christian Science Church constitute slightly more than 
four-and-a-half percent of the United States’s total population.2 
Jehovah’s Witnesses represent the most well known group with such prohibitions 
on their members’ conduct.  This group recognizes the importance of modern 
medicine, and its members receive treatment as most Americans do, with one 
exception:3 Jehovah’s Witnesses believe it is a sin to receive a blood transfusion, 
including one’s own recycled blood,4 or to use most types of blood products.5  
Abstaining from these treatments is so important to Jehovah’s Witnesses that most of 
them carry a medical emergency card indicating they explicitly do not consent to 
such treatment should they be unable to be consulted in the event such treatment may 
be deemed necessary.6  The Free Exercise Clause of the United States Constitution 
requires physicians to respect this request.7 
Unlike the Jehovah’s Witnesses, some other religious groups have a different 
view. Specifically, Christian Scientists believe that faith healing is the only true 
                                                                
2Id. These four minority Christian religions comprise a greater percentage than all non-
Christian religions in the United States combined, including Jews, Muslims, Buddhists, 
Hindus, the Native American Church, and Scientologists.  Id. 
3Jehovah’s Witnesses Official Web Site, http://www.watchtower.org/medical_care_and_ 
blood.htm (last visited Aug. 5, 2006). 
4J.L. Dixon & M.G. Smalley, Jehovah’s Witnesses: The Surgical/Ethical Challenge, 246 
JAMA 2471, 2472 (1981), available at http://www.watchtower.org/library/hb/article_06.htm.  
Jehovah’s Witnesses refuse “transfusion of whole blood, packed RBCs, and plasma, as well as 
WBC and platelet administration.”  Id.  This tenet is based on scripture in Genesis 9:3-4: 
“Only flesh with its soul—its blood—you must not eat,” and Acts 15:19-21: “Abstain from . . . 
fornication and from what is strangled and from blood.”  Id.  
5Recent changes in the church have led to reclassification of several blood products.  
Wikipedia, Jehovah's Witnesses and Blood Transfusions, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ 
Jehovah's_Witnesses_and_blood.htm (last visited Aug. 5, 2006).  So, while there is still a 
direct ban that will result in disfellowshipping and shunning from other members of the 
society if a Witness accepts red or white cells, platelets, or plasma, members must respect 
Witnesses who decide to use products composed of fractions of red or white cells, platelets, or 
plasma (including hemoglobin based substitutes, interferons, interleukins, albumin, globulins, 
clotting factors, and wound healing factors).  Associated Jehovah’s Witnesses for Reform on 
Blood, http://www.ajwrb.org/review6-15-04.shtml (last visited Aug. 5, 2006).  The Society 
considers accepting these products as a personal decision each Witness must make after 
careful prayer and meditation.  Id. 
6Jehovah’s Witnesses Official Web Site, http://www.watchtower.org/library/hb/article 
_04.htm (last visited Aug. 5, 2006).  There has been extensive litigation over whether hospitals 
have an obligation to do whatever it takes to save patients, regardless of their religious beliefs.  
The law is clear that it is an infringement on one’s Free Exercise Clause rights if a hospital or 
physician is aware of an adult’s religious beliefs but does not respect the patient’s wishes.  See 
Kristine Cordier Karnezis, Patient’s Right to Refuse Treatment Allegedly Necessary to Sustain 
Life, 93 A.L.R. 3D 67 (2005).  The issue is still hotly debated when medical decisions involve 
children.  See 61 AM. JUR. 2D Physicians, Surgeons, and Other Healers § 161 (2004). 
7See e.g., Fosmire v. Nicoleau, 551 N.E.2d 77 (N.E.1990). 
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medicine.8  Members of this group believe prayer is the best treatment for ailments.9  
Members can pray for themselves or may call upon a Christian Science practitioner 
for prayerful assistance.10 
The Pentecostal Free Will Baptist Church (PFWBC) is another minority 
Christian group that believes in divine healing.  This faith believes that “the Bible 
teaches that the healing provided in the atonement is both spiritual and physical.”11  
Members of the PFWBC believe “it is God’s highest will for His people to anoint, 
lay hands on, and pray for the healing of the sick.”12  Nevertheless, although this 
faith believes “the Bible teaches that there is nothing morally wrong with taking 
medicine, or receiving human aid, if one is not able to fully trust the Lord,”13 by 
receiving medical treatment, the logical conclusion is that one who accepts such 
treatment does not fully trust the Lord. 
Unfortunately, even though the First Amendment of the United States 
Constitution14 was designed on our founders’ beliefs that religious freedom and the 
freedom to exercise one’s religion were of chief importance,15 our courts 
systematically discriminate against members of these minority Christian religions for 
exercising those very rights.16  While it is commonly accepted that individuals have 
the right to practice these medically restrictive tenets,17 courts still punish plaintiffs 
by forcing them, when tortiously injured, to choose between what the majority 
considers “reasonable” and their own religious convictions.18  
The public policy behind the mitigation of damages doctrine is sound, but it 
should not apply when something as sacred as the right to exercise one’s religion is 
involved.  The doctrine intends to discourage wasted resources and to promote the 
least possible loss.19  Nevertheless, the doctrine does not properly take into account 
                                                                
8MARY BAKER EDDY, SCIENCE AND HEALTH WITH KEY TO THE SCRIPTURES 157 (First 
Church of Christ, Scientist 1994) (1875). 
9Religious Tolerance: Church Beliefs, http://www.religioustolerance.org/cr_sci.htm (last 
visited Oct. 30, 2006).  Christian Scientists do find it acceptable, however, to have bones set, 
cuts stitched, and teeth worked on by a dentist.  DEWITT JOHN, THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE WAY 
OF LIFE 127-28 (1962). 
10Religious Tolerance: Church Beliefs, http://www.religioustolerance.org/cr_sci.htm (last 
visited Oct. 30, 2006). 
11Faith and Practices of the Pentecostal Free Will Baptist Church, Inc., http://www.pfwb. 
org/faithpractices.htm#faithart9 (last visited Oct. 30, 2006). 
12Id. 
13Id. 
14“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the 
free exercise thereof. . . .”  U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
15United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 87 (1944). 
16See, e.g., Munn v. Algee, 924 F.2d 568 (5th Cir. 1991) (Rubin, J., dissenting); Williams 
v. Bright, 658 N.Y.S.2d 910 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997) (Rosenberger, J., dissenting). 
17See supra text accompanying note 6. 
18See infra Part III.B. 
19See infra note 29. 
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the personal loss a plaintiff is forced to accept by violating his religious beliefs in 
order to receive a full damage award.  Instead, applying the doctrine only encourages 
courts to judge the religious beliefs of a plaintiff on a “reasonableness” standard, 
which is distinctly prohibited by the First Amendment. 
Courts should end discrimination against minority religions by considering 
plaintiffs who profess such beliefs as plaintiffs with a pre-existing condition 
consisting of those beliefs.  This way, the pre-existing condition doctrine could be 
incorporated to provide some protection for such plaintiffs, ending their struggle 
between doing what their religious beliefs tell them is right and receiving just 
compensation for tortious injuries.  These plaintiffs are not seeking extra 
compensation for their injuries.  Rather, they seek permission to exercise their 
religious beliefs while being made whole as tort law enables other plaintiffs to be 
made whole. 
The decisions an injured plaintiff must make in these kinds of cases are not a 
matter of purposefully failing to receive medical treatment just to reap greater 
damage awards.  Negligent conduct leaves these plaintiffs with crippling injuries,20 
lasting pain,21 or even worse: many have lost their lives from blood loss.22  Money is 
not the basis of their decision—following the mandates of their religion is the basis 
of their decision.  These plaintiffs do not sit idly by in anticipation of their damage 
award, hoping to endure further suffering so to be awarded more money.  They are 
often faced with the awful choice of either living with the knowledge that they have 
sinned 23 or dying24 because of their beliefs.  The purpose of such a cause of action is 
to make the plaintiff whole.  The negligent action of the defendant, and only that 
negligent action, put the plaintiff in the position where this choice was necessary.  
So, why is it that courts tolerate such discrimination? 
Addressing this quandary, in Part II, this note discusses the background of the 
mitigation of damages doctrine.  Next, it explores case history exemplifying the 
treatment of religion regarding this doctrine.  It examines two primary cases 
illustrating how courts treat plaintiffs who make such a religious choice, as well as 
several cases that deal with individualized assessment for the receipt of government 
benefits.  This section concludes with a discussion about why the current law does 
not work to truly protect the rights of plaintiffs forced into such difficult decisions by 
tortious defendants. 
Part III discusses the thin-skull plaintiff doctrine in-depth and examines the 
different types of recognized pre-existing conditions.  Next, this section presents 
studies on how the brain processes religion and how each individual’s genetic 
                                                                
20See, e.g., Christianson v. Hollings, 112 P.2d 723 (Cal. Ct. App. 1941). 
21See, e.g., Montgomery v. Bd. of Ret., 109 Cal. Rptr. 181 (Cal. Ct. App. 1973).  
22See, e.g., Munn v. Algee, 924 F.2d 568 (5th Cir. 1991). 
23Sometimes the possibility that one may be shunned or excommunicated because of such 
a decision is a risk individuals with religious beliefs must face as well.  See, e.g., Carol 
Harrington, Father Shunned by Family for Defying Faith to Save Child, TORONTO STAR, Mar. 
11, 2002, at A7. 
24Not only dying, but also living with a condition causing chronic pain, some type of 
disability, or shortened life expectancy, etc. that a doctor believes internal surgery could 
alleviate. 
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makeup influences one’s beliefs.  This research gives courts even more incentive to 
consider religious beliefs as a pre-existing condition. 
Part IV analyzes how and why courts should apply the doctrine of pre-existing 
conditions to religious beliefs.  It discusses how courts already recognize 
conscientious objectors to war and provide them with a religious exemption to 
combative duty and how considering religious beliefs as a pre-existing condition is 
consistent with this practice.  In addition, this section illustrates how treating 
religious beliefs as a pre-existing condition will be consistent with three major cases 
the United States Supreme Court has issued as guideposts for dealing with First 
Amendment rights in situations of this nature. 
Part V concludes that the ability to exercise one’s religious beliefs is too 
important to be swept up in the mitigation of damages doctrine when the public 
policy reasons behind the doctrine are simply meant to prevent waste.  Instead, 
courts should use tools already at hand to offer First Amendment protections to 
plaintiffs by requiring a defendant to take his victim, as a whole, as he finds him.  
Religious beliefs cannot be separated from the man simply because they are not what 
the majority believes is reasonable.  Our country was founded upon that basic 
principle, and to do otherwise allows the majority to impose forbidden value 
judgments upon minorities. 
II.  CASE AND LEGAL BACKGROUND OF ISSUE 
The basic premise underlying the mitigation of damages doctrine is to prevent 
waste, specifically, to prevent a plaintiff from incurring greater injury from the tort 
than is necessary given the specific circumstances of each case.25  Still, this doctrine 
is not unlimited; a plaintiff is only required to act “reasonably” and generally is not 
required to go to extremes or do anything in conflict with his personal morals.26  
Nevertheless, courts still find a plaintiff who made a choice based on his religious 
beliefs acted “unreasonably” according to the doctrine of mitigation of damages 
when his choice was different from that which someone without his beliefs would 
have made if that person’s choice would have resulted in less injury to the plaintiff.27 
A.  Background on the Mitigation of Damages Doctrine and Religious Choices 
The Restatement (Second) of Torts states the doctrine of mitigation of damages 
concisely: “One injured by the tort of another is not entitled to recover damages for 
any harm that he could have avoided by the use of reasonable effort or expenditure 
after the commission of the tort.”28  The Restatement goes on to explain the 
reasoning behind this rule: “Recovery for the harm is denied because it is in part the 
result of the injured person’s lack of care, and public policy requires that persons 
                                                                
25RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 918 cmt. a (1979). 
26Id. at cmt. c. 
27See infra Part III.B.  
28RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 918 cmt. j (1979) (“Thus when a water company 
illegally refuses to turn on water unless the plaintiff pays a substantial bill that he does not 
owe and agrees not to sue for the return of the money, a customer who refuses to pay the bill is 
entitled to recover for the harm caused by the lack of water, even though he had the money 
and, if he had paid, would have been entitled to restitution because of the duress.”). 
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should be discouraged from wasting their resources, both physical or economic.”29  
Thus, the general damages rule is that “[i]f harm results because of [the plaintiff’s] 
careless failure to make substantial efforts . . . the damages for the harm suffered are 
reduced to the value of the efforts he should have made . . . in addition to the harm 
previously caused.”30  The burden of proof is on the defendant to prove that 
aggravation of the condition resulted from the plaintiff’s failure to seek or to follow 
medical advice.31 
To determine whether an injured plaintiff has taken reasonable action to mitigate 
his damages, courts consider the plaintiff’s “physical and mental condition after an 
injury.”32  The plaintiff is under a “duty to use ordinary care in following [medical] 
advice,” and “damages may be decreased . . . if, but only if, a reasonably prudent 
person would have followed the medical advice given, and if the failure of the 
plaintiff to do so causes a worsening of his . . . condition.”33  Additionally, “[a] 
person is not ordinarily required to surrender a right of substantial value in order to 
minimize loss.”34  Nevertheless, this part of the rule does not apply to religious 
beliefs.35 
Generally, a plaintiff is not required to go to extremes to mitigate his damages: 
“It is frequently reasonable for a person threatened by further harm from a tortious 
act to refuse to subject himself to pain or to a danger of a different kind, which it 
would be necessary to undergo if the further harm is to be averted.”36  Courts have 
interpreted “pain or . . . danger of a different kind” to mean that injured plaintiffs 
need not subject themselves to extremely dangerous37 surgeries, extremely painful 
treatment,38 or treatment that will be unlikely to significantly improve their 
condition.39  Conversely, courts have held that failure to mitigate damages because of 
                                                                
29Id. at cmt. a; see also, 22 AM. JUR. 2D Damages § 371 (2004) (“A plaintiff cannot refuse 
treatment and then claim damages for conditions resulting from that refusal.”). 
30RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 918 cmt. b (1979). 
313 DAMAGES IN TORT ACTIONS (MB) § 16.03 (2005). 
32RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 918 cmt. c (1979). 
3322 AM. JUR. 2D Damages § 371 (2004). 
34RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 918 cmt. j (1979). 
35Gary Knapp, Refusal of Medical Treatment on Religious Grounds as Affecting Right to 
Recover for Personal Injury or Death, 3 A.L.R. 5th 721 (2004). 
36RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 918 cmt. d (1979).  
3722 AM. JUR. 2D Damages § 374 (2004).   
38RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 918 cmt. d (1979). 
3922 AM. JUR. 2D Damages § 373 (2004) (“[I]f the proposed treatment could result in the 
aggravation of an existing condition or the development of an additional condition of ill 
health, or if the prospect for improved health is slight, then there should be no duty to undergo 
treatment.”); see also id. at § 375 (“A plaintiff will not be charged with lack of care for failing 
to obtain a particular treatment if there is conflicting medical testimony as to the probability of 
a cure, or if a surgeon was only recommending exploratory surgery that appeared to be 
worthwhile to try.”). 
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religious beliefs,40 laziness,41 or a belief that the tortfeasor will be liable for all costs42 
is within the scope of action a plaintiff is liable for himself.  Then, his award is 
reduced to the extent that he did not mitigate his damages under the given 
circumstances.  Nevertheless, “the plaintiff must have known of the means of 
mitigation; there must be evidence that the plaintiff had been advised by a doctor that 
he or she should submit to a particular treatment,”43 for this doctrine to apply.  
Furthermore, so long as a plaintiff picks a reasonable treatment option, if, in 
hindsight, another option may have been more successful, the plaintiff’s choice will 
not bar his full recovery.44 
B. Mitigation of Damages, Beliefs, and Religion 
The doctrine of mitigation of damages generally does not require injured parties 
to “make efforts that conflict with certain personal choices.”45  For example, in cases 
of wrongful life or wrongful birth, courts have ruled, as a matter of law, that 
mitigation of damages is not necessary to the extent it necessitates either adoption or 
abortion.46   
In Troppi v. Scarf,47 the plaintiff’s pharmacist negligently filled her birth control 
prescription with tranquilizers.48  The plaintiff subsequently became pregnant and 
gave birth to a healthy child.49  She filed suit against the pharmacist, seeking 
                                                                
40See, e.g., Munn v. Algee, 924 F.2d 568 (5th Cir. 1991). 
41See, e.g., Thomas v. Plovidba, 653 F. Supp. 1300 (E.D. Wis. 1987) (finding that plaintiff 
did not mitigate damages by missing job interviews, demonstrating bad hygiene at interviews, 
and showing up to interviews poorly dressed). 
423 DAMAGES IN TORT ACTIONS (MB) § 16.02 (2005) (“[T]he injured party may not just 
stand idly by and watch his losses grow in anticipation of recovering enhanced damages.”). 
4322 AM. JUR. 2D Damages § 377 (2004). 
44RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 918 cmt. c (1979). 
45Id. at cmt. j. 
463 DAMAGES IN TORT ACTIONS (MB) § 16.02 (2005); Comras v. Lewin, 443 A.2d 229, 
230 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1982)  
The right to have an abortion may not be automatically converted to an obligation to 
have one.  The decision whether or not to undertake that medical procedure must rest 
on a number of factors, including the stage to which the pregnancy has progressed, the 
health and condition of the woman at the time and the professional judgment and 
counsel received. 
Id. Smith v. Gore, 728 S.W.2d 738, 751-52 (Tenn. 1987) (rejecting abortion or adoption as 
part of duty to mitigate the court stated: “We think that not only would imposing these choices 
upon a plaintiff impermissibly infringe upon Constitutional rights to privacy in these matters, 
but the nature of these alternatives is so extreme as to be unreasonable. . . .”); see also Troppi 
v. Scarf, 187 N.W.2d 511 (Mich. Ct. App. 1971); Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W.2d 
169 (Minn. 1977); Morris v. Sanchez, 746 P.2d 184, 189 (Okla. 1987). 
47Troppi, 187 N.W.2d at 511. 
48Id.  at 512. 
49Id. at 513. 
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damages for the costs associated with the child and for pain and anxiety.50  In his 
defense, the pharmacist asserted that the plaintiff failed to mitigate her damages by 
not having an abortion when she discovered she was pregnant or, alternatively, by 
giving the child up for adoption after its birth.51   
The court found that the defendant had to take his victim as he found her, 
including her personal beliefs.52  It observed, “[a] living child almost universally 
gives rise to emotional and spiritual bonds which few parents can bring themselves 
to break.”53  Then, the court went on to quote from McCormick on Damages, 
explaining how it interpreted reasonableness:  
If the effort, risk, sacrifice, or expense which the person wronged must 
incur in order to avoid or minimize a loss of injury is such that under the 
circumstances a reasonable man might well decline to incur it, a failure to 
do so imposes no disability against recovering full damages.54 
Ultimately, the Troppi Court found that the burden such a hard decision would 
have on the plaintiff’s conscience tipped the reasonableness scale in favor of the 
plaintiff’s decision because it would be worse for the plaintiff to give the child away 
than for her to keep him.55  It stated: 
[E]ven though the parents may not want to rear the child they may 
conclude that the psychological impact on them of rejecting the child and 
placing him for adoption, never seeing him again, would be such that, 
making the best of a bad situation, it is better to rear the child than to 
place him for adoption.56   
In addition, the court ruled that “the defendant does not have the right to insist 
that the victim of his negligence have the emotional and mental makeup of a woman 
who is willing to abort or place a child for adoption.”57  In essence, the court found 
that the pharmacist had to take his victim as he found her.  Accordingly, the plaintiff 
could recover the full amount of damages for the costs of having the child, including 
lost wages, medical and hospital expenses, and for her pain and anxiety, and possibly 
even the costs of rearing the child to majority.58 
Nevertheless, even though abortion constitutes “medical treatment,” and courts 
consider the psychological impact an abortion would have on the parent, when 
                                                                
50Id. 
51See id. at 519. 
52Id. at 520. 
53Troppi, 187 N.W.2d at 519. 
54Id. (citing CHARLES TILFORD MCCORMICK, DAMAGES § 35 (2d ed. 1952)). 
55Id. 
56Id. at 520. 
57Id. 
58Id. at 520-21 (Michigan law did not preclude damages for raising the child to majority 
because “there need only be a basis for reasonable ascertainment of the amount of the 
damages.”). 
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confronted with a case where other medical treatment can have a similar 
psychological impact, a court will still reduce damages when it finds the plaintiff 
was “unreasonable” in failing to seek or consent to treatment.59  Courts routinely 
reduce damages even though medical decisions based on religious beliefs can have 
this kind of psychological impact on the plaintiff.60 
1.  Two Significant Cases 
Munn v. Algee61 exemplifies the current law regarding religion and mitigation of 
damages.  In Munn, the defendant’s negligent driving caused an automobile accident 
that seriously injured the plaintiff.62  The physicians treating the plaintiff sought her 
consent to perform a blood transfusion.63  Because the plaintiff was a Jehovah’s 
Witness, she would not consent to the treatment because she believed doing so 
would be committing a grievous sin.64  Later, after the plaintiff lost consciousness, 
her husband, who was also a Jehovah’s Witness, would not consent to a blood 
transfusion on his wife’s behalf.65  The plaintiff subsequently died during surgery 
                                                                
59In his book, Ideals, Beliefs, Attitudes, and the Law, Guido Calabresi suggests an 
interesting scenario that, much like abortion, courts may also recognize as an exception to 
mitigate.  GUIDO CALABRESI, IDEALS, BELIEFS, ATTITUDES, AND THE LAW 49-50 (Syracuse 
University Press 1985).  In his example, Calabresi wonders what might happen if a deeply 
religious Catholic woman were to be injured in such a way that made pregnancy very 
dangerous to her health.  Id.  If the woman took the teachings of the Catholic church literally 
she would be forbidden to use any method of birth control with her husband other than the 
rhythm method (or abstinence).  Id.  If she subsequently became pregnant and was injured as a 
result, Calabresi postulates that she would be able to recover because of how the Learned 
Hand test for reasonableness is stated:  
One must weigh the benefits and harms that would occur from doing one thing against 
the benefits and harms that would occur from doing the other, each discounted by the 
likelihood of the harms and benefits occurring.  If on striking that balance a given 
behavior is reasonable, it is not rendered unreasonable merely because an unwanted 
result chanced to come about.   
Id. Accordingly, a court would also find it not reasonable to expect her to have an abortion for 
the same reasons stated in Troppi.  See supra Part II.B. 
60See, e.g., Munn v. Algee, 924 F.2d 568 (5th Cir. 1991); Corlett v. Caserta, 562 N.E.2d 
257 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990).  Assuming, of course, that the jurisdiction does not have a specific 
statute allowing for compensatory protection for damages resulting from injury that let the 
plaintiff make a religious choice not to be conventionally treated.  See, e.g., WIS. STAT. § 
102.42 (2005) (providing for worker’s compensation coverage of Christian Science treatment 
if the employee wishes to receive that type of treatment but giving employers the option not to 
cover these services).  These statutes are rare, but given the current state of the law, they are 
the only way legislatures can ensure religious exercise protection for their constituents in the 
realm of private tort damage awards.  
61Munn, 924 F.2d at 568. 
62Id. at 570-71. 
63Id. at 571. 
64See id.  See also Munn v. Algee, 719 F. Supp. 525, 526 (N.D. Miss. 1989), aff’d, 924 
F.2d 568 (5th Cir. 1991). 
65Munn, 924 F.2d at 571. 
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from blood loss.66  Mrs. Munn’s surviving spouse and her children brought a 
wrongful death claim against the negligent driver on her behalf, and Mr. Munn 
sought damages for his injuries as well.67  “The court granted a directed verdict in 
favor of plaintiffs on the question of liability.”68 
The main issue in Munn was whether it was admissible to have allowed Munn to 
be questioned, on cross examination, about practices and beliefs of the Jehovah’s 
Witnesses that did not pertain to the reasonableness of Mrs. Munn’s refusal of a 
blood transfusion or to the sincerity of her beliefs.69  On appeal, the court found that 
the trial court abused its discretion by allowing in such testimony, including whether 
Jehovah’s Witnesses salute the United States flag.70  Nevertheless, the majority 
found that such evidence was merely harmless error and did not adversely influence 
the jury.71  Judge Rubin wrote a grilling dissent in the case, adamantly disagreeing 
with this outcome.72 
The court went on to examine whether the trial court allowed the jury to assess 
the reasonableness of Munn’s beliefs.73  The jury instruction used to decide the case 
“attempt[ed] to accommodate Mrs. Munn’s religious beliefs.”74  In affirming the 
denial of a damage award for the wrongful death claim, the court ruled that when the 
trial court decided the plaintiff did not mitigate her damages as required by law, it 
was only evaluating the reasonableness of her refusal of a blood transfusion, not the 
reasonableness of her beliefs as a Jehovah’s Witness.75  
The dissent in Munn took issue against the validity of this jury instruction.76  
Judge Rubin pointed out that the award the jury returned for pain and suffering was 
undoubtedly influenced by the jury’s negative perception of Jehovah’s Witnesses, as 
it was significantly less than a typical award for injuries as extensive as Mrs. Munn 




69Id. at 572. 
70Id. at 572, 581. 
71Munn, 924 F.2d at 573. 
72See id. at 579-80 (dissenting opinion). 
73Id. at 574 (majority opinion). 
74Id. The actual jury instruction stated:  
In determining whether or not Elaine Munn’s decision to refuse the blood transfusion 
was unreasonable, you may consider that the blood transfusions were medically 
recommended.  But, you may also consider her religious beliefs and related teachings, 
together with the known risks of blood transfusions, if you find that to be a factor in 
her decision.   
Id. at 578. 
75See id. at 578. 
76In closing, Judge Rubin stated, “Algee’s lawyer deliberately threw the proverbial skunk 
of inadmissible evidence into the jury box.  No amount of conjecture that the jury might not 
have smelled the stink can undo the odor that, even now, permeates the record.”  Id. at 585 
(emphasis in original). 
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suffered.77  Additionally, in addressing the utter lack of any award to Mr. Munn, 
Judge Rubin stated:  
I can conceive of no reason but general dislike of the plaintiff for a jury to 
award medical expenses against an admittedly liable defendant, but to 
award nothing for pain and suffering when the uncontroverted evidence 
was that Munn suffered pain and general discomfort from his ‘bruises and 
contusions’ for several months.78 
The second issue in Munn was whether the trial court violated Munn’s First 
Amendment rights when it determined that she failed to mitigate damages because of 
her religious beliefs against blood transfusions.79  Addressing the Free Exercise 
concern raised, the court relied on Employment Division, Department of Human 
Resources v. Smith.80  In that case, the United States Supreme Court examined a law 
that burdened Smith’s ability to practice his religion.81  Because the burdensome law 
was neutral on its face, not specifically discriminating against any particular religion, 
the Court held that it was constitutional.82 
The Munn Court decided that the facts at hand were similar enough to warrant 
the same outcome as in Smith.  It found that the mitigation of damages doctrine 
could be compared to  “generally applicable rules imposing incidental burdens on 
particular religions,” so it did “not violate the Free Exercise Clause” to hold the 
plaintiff to a reasonable person standard for mitigating damages.83  But by dismissing 
this claim so easily, the court missed the point of Smith—in cases of individualized 
assessment, a plaintiff is entitled to greater protection.84  Specifically, in cases of 
individualized assessment, the government must justify rules that burden the exercise 
of religion with a compelling government purpose.85  What greater instance could 
there be for individualized assessment than by a jury of one’s peers, given an 
instruction such as the Munn jury used? 
The Munn court also found that this case did not violate the Establishment 
Clause.  It recognized that the reasonableness of a plaintiff’s religious beliefs could 
be subject to scrutiny by a jury, and such an examination of the plaintiff’s religion 
could involve weighing the reasonableness of religious beliefs in violation of the 
Establishment Clause.86  In a circular explanation for its finding, the court reasoned 
that the Establishment Clause was not violated in this case because Munn interjected 
                                                                
77Munn, 924 F.2d at 583, 585. 
78Id. at 585. 
79Id. at 574-75. 
80Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
81Id.  at 874. 
82Id.  at 885-86. 
83Munn, 924 F.2d at 574. 
84See Smith, 494 U.S. at 884. 
85See infra Part III.B. 
86Munn, 924 F.2d at 574-75. 
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religion into the case himself in an attempt to explain his wife’s conduct that a jury 
would probably find unreasonable without the religious explanation.87  In a footnote, 
the court directed that future cases should be decided using an objective person 
standard and, as such, should disallow accommodating a plaintiff’s religious 
beliefs.88  
Williams v. Bright89 is another case with an outcome similar to Munn.  This case 
also involved a Jehovah’s Witness plaintiff who was in a car accident that caused her 
serious injuries.90  Surgery was an option for the plaintiff in this case, and her 
physicians believed it would prevent her from being wheelchair-bound for the rest of 
her life.91  Unfortunately, the plaintiff “was obliged to refuse these recommended 
surgeries because her church prohibit[ed] the blood transfusions they would 
necessarily entail.”92 
Attempting to protect the plaintiff’s right to freely exercise her religion, the trial 
court gave the jury an instruction that required it to consider what a reasonable 
Jehovah’s Witness would have done in the same situation.93  Nevertheless, on appeal, 
the court found this instruction to be in error.  Specifically, it found that the court’s 
instruction was a “sham inquiry,” and the court “foreclosed the issue [of her religious 
beliefs] in her favor without any supporting evidence.”94  This decision, the court 
reasoned, “effectively provided government endorsement to those beliefs.”95   
Then, the court went on to explain that even if the trial court had required 
evidence of the plaintiff’s beliefs, it would necessarily find itself in a quandary as to 
how to do so.96  Even so, what the court ignored is that courts have been able to put 
themselves in a situation to discern such a fact in many instances.  For example, 
courts have successfully addressed this same issue in cases arguing over 
conscientious objector exemption to combative service,97 as well as in cases of 
individualized assessment.98 
Similar to Munn, Williams contains a censorious dissent, authored by Judge 
Rosenberger, who believed the jury instruction was proper.99  He asserted that this 
instruction was in line with the rule of mitigation of damages, which does not require 
                                                                
87Id. at 575. 
88Id. at 575 n.12. 
89Williams v. Bright, 658 N.Y.S.2d 910 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997). 
90Id. at 911. 
91Id. at 912. 
92Id.  
93Id. 
94Id. at 914. 
95Id. 
96Id.   
97See infra Part IV.B. 
98See infra Part II.B.2. 
99See Williams, 658 N.Y.S.2d at 916.  
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one to minimize one’s losses at the expense of personal beliefs.100  Furthermore, 
Judge Rosenberger emphasized that the jury charge was “in conformity with our tort 
system” and “allow[ed] for an assessment of the actual situation of [the] victim . . . 
.”101  Pointing out that the “‘eggshell plaintiff’ has not been limited to physical 
infirmities,” Judge Rosenberger stressed that this instruction followed the basic 
premise that a defendant must take his victim as he finds him.102 
2. Individualized Assessments for Benefits 
There are several cases concerning state benefits that directly address Free 
Exercise concerns, but unlike tort cases, courts in these instances carefully follow a 
First Amendment analysis that recognizes the danger of crossing into the forbidden 
territory of judging religious beliefs. 
For example, in Montgomery v. Board of Retirement,103 the plaintiff would not 
undergo surgery to remove a tumor.104  If she underwent the surgery, it was very 
likely that she would fully recover and be able to return to work; however, without 
the surgery, it was likely that she would remain disabled and perhaps even die from 
the tumor.105 
The court found that the county violated the Free Exercise Clause when it denied 
Montgomery disability retirement benefits for her decision not to undergo surgery 
because of her beliefs as a member of the Church of God.106  The court ruled that the 
denial of retirement benefits indirectly burdened the employee’s free exercise of 
religion by forcing her to choose between following the precepts of her religion and 
the disability benefits.107 
In deciding this case, the court relied on the United States Supreme Court 
decision in Sherbert v. Verner.108  Sherbert presented a similar situation, where the 
plaintiff was a Seventh-Day Adventist who would not work on Saturday, the 
Sabbath-Day for her religion.109  She sought new employment after her employer 
discharged her for refusing to work mandatory Saturday shifts, but she could not find 
a position that would allow her to observe her Sabbath-Day.110  When she applied for 
unemployment benefits, the state denied her claim because of her refusal to work on 
                                                                
100Id. at 918 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 918 cmt. j (1979)). 
101Id. at 919. 
102Id. 
103Montgomery v. Bd. of Ret., 109 Cal. Rptr. 181 (Cal Ct. App. 1973). 
104Id. at 183. 
105Id. 
106Id. at 183-84 (finding that position as “member, officer, worker, and teacher” in the 
church precluded plaintiff from committing the sin of undergoing internal surgery). 
107Id. at 184. 
108Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
109Id. at 399. 
110Id. 
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Saturdays.111  The Court applied a two-part test: (1) whether the application of the 
unemployment statute imposed any burden upon the free exercise of the claimant’s 
religion; and (2) if so, whether there was a compelling state interest that justified the 
infringement upon Free Exercise rights.112 
In Sherbert, the Court ruled that the state’s unemployment scheme was 
unconstitutional, as it forced her to “choose between following the precepts of her 
religion and forfeiting benefits, on the one hand, and abandoning one of the precepts 
of her religion in order to accept work, on the other hand.”113  The Court noted 
“condition[ing] the availability of benefits upon this appellant’s willingness to 
violate a cardinal principle of her religious faith effectively penalizes the free 
exercise of her constitutional liberties.”114  Therefore, just as in Sherbert, the 
government burdened the plaintiff in Montgomery in her practice of religion because 
it forced her to choose between receiving benefits and violating a tenet of her 
religious faith. 
Furthermore, in Montgomery, the court addressed the second part of the Sherbert 
test: “[W]hether some compelling state interest justifies the substantial infringement 
of appellant’s First Amendment right.”115  Sherbert reasoned that when such an 
important right is at stake, the state would have to show more than a rational basis 
for its infringement.116  Specifically, in Sherbert, the state did not meet its burden of 
proof; the possibility that fraudulent claimants could take advantage of the system 
and cripple it by diluting available funds and interfering with employer scheduling 
was not sufficient.117  Therefore, in Montgomery, although the state reasoned that the 
government had an interest in “preserving the life and health of its citizens,” this 
interest was not great enough to merit infringing on First Amendment rights.118  
There was no evidence in Montgomery that making exceptions to accommodate First 
Amendment rights would disrupt or dilute the retirement plan enough to justify the 
state in its denial.119  Additionally, the court determined that there was no alternative 
that would infringe less upon her Free Exercise rights.120 
More recently, the United States Supreme Court has reinforced the importance of 
protecting religious rights when cases of individualized assessment are at issue.  In 
                                                                
111Id. at. 399-400. 
112Id. at 403. 
113Id. at 404. 
114Id. at 406.  
115Montgomery v. Bd. of Ret., 109 Cal. Rptr. 181 (Cal. Ct. App. 1973). 
116Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406. 
117Id. at 407. 
118Montgomery, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 185 (stating that “[w]hen considerations of conscience 
grounded upon religious beliefs are involved, the state interest in preserving health pales into 
insignificance”). 
119Id.  “Furthermore, in a constitutional context involving basic rights, the preservation of 
moneys is not of primary significance.”  Id. (citing Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970)). 
120Id. 
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Smith,121 the Supreme Court addressed this topic directly.  In this case, Smith was 
fired from his job for sacramental use of peyote, which was an illegal drug in 
Oregon.122  When he applied for unemployment benefits, the Employment Appeals 
Board denied his request because his employer discharged him for work-related 
“misconduct.”123  The Court found that it was permissible for a state to pass a law 
that “incidentally forbids . . . the performance of an act that [a] religious belief 
requires . . . if the law is not specifically directed to religious practice and is 
otherwise constitutional as applied to those who engage in the specified act for 
nonreligious reasons.”124  In reaching its conclusion, the Court determined that the 
Sherbert test was reserved for an instance that specifically “lent itself to 
individualized governmental assessment of the reasons for the relevant conduct.”125  
In Smith, the Sherbert test was inapplicable because a law of valid and neutral 
general applicability was applied as a total prohibition against particular conduct, 
and any burden placed upon a particular religion was merely incidental.126 
C.  Lack of a Realistic Solution 
As these cases illustrate, courts do not apply the law fairly across the board when 
the same facts are at hand.  Courts dealing with tort damages hold that it is 
impermissible for a jury to consider if a person acted reasonably given his religious 
beliefs,127 although courts dealing with government benefits require beliefs to be an 
inviolable right of the plaintiff that are not to be subjected to an objective test of 
reasonableness.128  Furthermore, courts do not recognize that judgment by a jury of a 
plaintiff’s actions in tort cases is an instance of individualized assessment, thereby 
invoking the protections of Sherbert.  The result is a constitutional mess that must 
leave plaintiffs wondering what “Free Exercise rights” really means. 
It is obvious that if one has to choose between recovering damages and asserting 
the right to follow one’s faith, cases like Munn and Williams discourage the free 
exercise of religion.  In Williams, the court believed it would be endorsing the beliefs 
of the plaintiff if it accepted as fact that the plaintiff held the beliefs she professed.129  
Notwithstanding, the Williams court, as well as the Munn court,130 ignored the 
subsequent consequence of holding a plaintiff to a reasonable person standard.  The 
standard that courts hold the objective, reasonable person to is the standard of the 
majority.  Accordingly, the system of beliefs (religious or otherwise) that the juror 
                                                                
121Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 874 (1990). 
122Id.  
123Id. 
124Id. at 873. 
125Id. at 884. 
126Id. at 885. 
127See supra Part II.A. 
128See supra Part II.B. 
129Williams v. Bright, 658 N.Y.S.2d 910 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997). 
130See supra Part II.B.1. 
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must follow when making this “reasonableness” decision are the beliefs of the 
majority.  Therefore, the court allows the majority’s system of beliefs to be 
controlling because the standard that it judges “reasonableness” by is that of the 
majority.  Accordingly, it violates the Establishment Clause by allowing for judicial 
acknowledgement of a certain set of beliefs as “the right ones.”  Accordingly, if the 
court were endorsing anyone’s religious beliefs it would be endorsing the beliefs of 
the majority, and this endorsement cuts to the very purpose for the Establishment 
Clause.  
A look at one of the United States Supreme Court’s on-point decisions sheds 
some light on the subject.  Walz v. Tax Commission of New York131 addressed a 
problem significantly similar to the issue stated above.  In Walz, the Court upheld a 
New York statute from constitutional attack that granted property tax exemptions to 
religious organizations so long as they only used the property for “religious 
worship.”132  The Court held that this statute did not violate the Establishment Clause 
because it granted tax exemption to all religious groups, not just to select churches or 
groups.133  To the contrary, the Court found that allowing religious groups “freedom 
from taxation . . . operated affirmatively to help guarantee the free exercise of all 
forms of religious beliefs.”134  Allowing judicial acknowledgement of all religious 
beliefs in tort cases would be neutral as well, staying safely within constitutional 
limits.  
The Williams Court did have a valid point when it raised the issue of what would 
happen had conflicting expert testimony on the plaintiff’s religious beliefs been 
presented.135  It is clear that the law does not allow this inquiry: the Supreme Court 
specifically addressed this issue long ago.  In United States v. Ballard,136 the 
defendant was indicted on mail fraud charges for organizing a group that distributed 
and sold literature through the mail putting forth the defendant’s religious doctrines 
and for soliciting funds and memberships from those who responded.137  The 
Supreme Court adamantly opposed submitting to the jury the question of whether 
there was truth in the defendant’s beliefs.138  The Court identified the primary error 
involved with such a jury instruction.  It stated:  
The religious views espoused by respondents might seem incredible, if not 
preposterous, to most people.  But if those doctrines are subject to trial 
before a jury charged with finding their truth or falsity, then the same can 
be done with the religious beliefs of any sect.  When the triers of fact 
undertake that task, they enter a forbidden domain.  The First Amendment 
                                                                
131Walz v. Tax Comm’n of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664, 666 (1970). 
132Id. 
133Id. at 672-73. 
134Id. at 678. 
135Williams v. Bright, 658 N.Y.S.2d 910 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997). 
136United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1994). 
137See id. at 79. 
138Id. at 86. 
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does not select any one group or any one type of religion for preferred 
treatment.  It puts them all in that position.139  
Ballard set the foundation for cases in the future regarding religious beliefs.  No 
court may charge a jury to judge whether one’s beliefs are true or false.140  To do so 
directly contradicts the Free Exercise Clause.  Essentially, allowing a jury to judge 
one’s actions stemming from the right to freely exercise one’s religion does just 
that—it forces the jury to judge whether the beliefs of a plaintiff are reasonable.  A 
court cannot separate the plaintiff’s actions and his beliefs in this instance because 
the actions represent the beliefs themselves.  Instead, the issue for the jury is whether 
the defendant himself held these beliefs.141 
The Williams court did not complete its thought on the conflicting expert 
testimony in its rush to argue that when the trial court simply accepted the plaintiff’s 
beliefs as a fact it endorsed her beliefs in violation of the Establishment Clause.142  
The court did not stop and note that cases of individualized assessment and 
conscientious objection force such a delicate question upon courts that have found a 
test that satisfies such a difficult inquiry.  The root of this test is that the beliefs of the 
individual must be considered part and parcel of his persona, with no limit upon 
which system of beliefs are offered this treatment.143  To take any other approach 
impermissibly steps upon the toes of his freedom to exercise.  Essentially, courts 
treat the individual as it finds him.  
Arguing over what is the proper reasonable person standard for each case or 
whether reasonable believers of whatever religion are acting reasonably does not 
offer plaintiffs adequate protection of their constitutional rights.  There will never be 
a reasonable solution if courts are limited to these two choices.  The objective 
(majority belief) reasonable person standard clearly violates the Establishment 
Clause, as explained above.  Meanwhile, a reasonable belief standard allows the 
impermissible inquiry into beliefs that Williams complains of.144  The only remedy is 
to take the approach that a defendant must simply take his victim as he finds him—
with religious beliefs as part and parcel of the individual. 
                                                                
139Id. at 87. 
140See id. 
141Id. at 84. 
142Williams v. Bright, 658 N.Y.S.2d 910 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997). 
143This test must also focus on the individual who holds the beliefs, not the way others of 
his religious group hold beliefs.  See Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Indep. Employment Sec. 
Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981).   In this case, the plaintiff, a Jehovah’s Witness, argued it was 
against his personal religious beliefs to work on tanks even though other Witnesses did not 
share this belief.  Id. at 714.  The Court ruled the Sherbert test still applied and the plaintiff 
was entitled to unemployment benefits even though not all Jehovah’s Witnesses would have 
made the same decision.  Id. at 715, 720.  The Court stated, “the guarantee of free exercise is 
not limited to beliefs which are shared by all of the members of a religious sect.”  Id. at 715-
16.  
144Williams, 658 N.Y.S.2d at 910.  See supra Part II.B.1. 
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III.  HOW RELIGIOUS BELIEFS FIT AS A PRE-EXISTING STATE OF THE PLAINTIFF 
There are several different types of pre-existing conditions that courts recognize, 
all of which require the defendant to take his victim as he finds him.  Courts allow 
recovery for injuries compounded by such pre-existing conditions, regardless of 
whether they are foreseeable to the defendant.145  Most often, physical conditions are 
the subject of litigation; however, courts have applied the doctrine of pre-existing 
conditions in instances outside of the strictly physical sense as well.146  Furthermore, 
science has found physical traces in the body that at least show a predisposition to 
religious beliefs.147  Consequently, it is reasonable to treat religious beliefs as a pre-
existing condition of a plaintiff. 
A.  What is a Pre-Existing Condition? 
The law concerning aggravation of pre-existing conditions is very clear, and 
courts throughout the United States universally apply it.148  Generally, a defendant 
must take his plaintiff as he finds him, and the defendant is liable to the plaintiff for 
injuries that occur because of any special sensitivity the plaintiff has, such as a “pre-
existing disease, condition, or predisposition to injury.”149  Such a person is often 
referred to as an “eggshell skull”150 or “thin-skull” plaintiff.151  When a defendant 
encounters such a plaintiff, it is irrelevant whether the plaintiff’s pre-existing 
condition makes his damages “more extensive than could have been foreseen or 
reasonably expected.”152  For example, if a plaintiff has an abnormally thin skull and 
suffers death from an injury that would normally cause only a bump on a normal 
person, the rule is that the defendant is liable for all of his victim’s injuries.153  As is 
any plaintiff, the plaintiff with the thin skull is still responsible for mitigating his 
damages, if possible, even though the injury he suffers is greater than what the 
defendant could expect from a plaintiff without such a pre-existing condition.154  But 
a court will not deny him recovery for any extensive injuries that occur because of 
his pre-existing condition.155 
                                                                
145See infra Part III.A. 
146See infra Part III.A.2. 
147See infra Part III.B. 
1482 DAMAGES IN TORT ACTIONS § 15.03(1)(a) (2005) (citing to a decision applying this 
doctrine in every state). 
149Id. 
150W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 43 (West 5th 
ed. 1984). 
1512 DAMAGES IN TORT ACTIONS § 15.03(1)(a) (2005). 
152Id. at (1)(b); see also Figueroa-Torres v. Toledo-Davila, 232 F.3d 270, 275 (1st Cir. 
2000) (emphasizing that foreseeability of extensive injury is not required when a plaintiff has 
a pre-existing condition). 
153KEETON ET AL., supra note 150, at 292. 
1543 DAMAGES IN TORT ACTIONS § 16.01 (2005). 
1552 DAMAGES IN TORT ACTIONS § 15.03(1)(b) (2005). 
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1.  Mental Conditions 
Courts treat many mental maladies as pre-existing conditions when plaintiffs 
claim the defendant’s tortious conduct resulted in injury.156  Schizophrenic 
episodes,157 post-traumatic stress disorder,158 and depression159 are common pre-
existing mental conditions that require application of the thin-skull plaintiff doctrine. 
For example, in Barlow v. Plummer,160 the plaintiff was involved in a car 
accident that caused her whiplash161 and triggered a relapse of her reoccurring mental 
illness.162  The defendant’s negligence did not cause her depressive disorder, but it 
aggravated her condition so that where she had been stable before the accident, she 
now suffered a relapse of her depression. 163  Accordingly, she was entitled to 
damages for the aggravation of her pre-existing condition.164 
Botek v. Mine Safety Appliance Corp.165 presents another case where the court 
considered emotional damage caused by the defendant’s negligence.  Botek 
participated in a firefighter training exercise, which required the use of an oxygen 
mask.166  Unfortunately, the manufacturer of his air pack had mistakenly filled it with 
carbon monoxide instead of oxygen.167  Botek passed out and awoke to find 
emergency personnel treating him with oxygen.168  He suffered headaches, 
disorientation, and nausea immediately after the incident; however, as time went by, 
his mental condition deteriorated severely.169 
The examining psychologist at trial concluded that Botek suffered from Post-
Traumatic Stress Syndrome caused by the accident, and this disorder kept him from 
seeking treatment for the problem for several years.170  The court stated, “[i]t is 
                                                                
15622 AM. JUR. 2D Damages § 239 (2004). 
157See, e.g., Turner v. Haynie, 607 S.W.2d 86 (Ark. Ct. App. 1980). 
158See, e.g., Botek v. Mine Safety Appliance Corp., 611 A.2d 1174 (Pa. 1992). 
159See, e.g., Barlow v. Plummer, 195 So. 2d 321 (La. Ct. App. 1967). 
160Id. 
161Id. at 322. 
162Id. at 324 (explaining that Barlow was diagnosed as a pseudoneurotic schizophrenic). 
163See id. at 325-26. 
164Id. at 325.  On appeal, the court reduced the amount of damages awarded by $3,000.  It 
found that plaintiff’s “emotional [and] mental disturbance[s] so triggered [were] not of such a 
nature that it disabled [plaintiff] or caused her any great suffering” because it only took her 
“seven or eight visits to her treating psychiatrist over a period of five or six months” to 
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165Botek v. Mine Safety Appliance Corp., 611 A.2d 1174 (Pa. 1992). 
166Id. at 1174. 
167Id. 
168Id. at 1175. 
169Id. 
170Id. 
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simple black letter law that a tortfeasor must take its victim as it finds him.”171  
Furthermore, the court asserted, “[i]t is clear that where a claimant’s rejection of 
treatment is part of his emotional injuries, he may recover damages in spite of the 
failure to receive treatment.”172  Therefore, although it is likely that not all plaintiffs 
who are injured will suffer such emotional disturbances as Botek did, he had some 
type of predisposition that caused him to react this way.  The court recognized this 
predisposition and it is for that reason that the principle that a tortfeasor must take his 
victim as he finds him was applicable in this case. 
Similarly, the court considered the mental condition of the plaintiff in Troppi, as 
explained earlier.173  The court considered the plaintiff’s mental makeup an 
inseparable part of her so the defendant had to take her as he found her: unwilling to 
give up her child.174 
Proving emotional disturbances presents a challenge to parties in court; however, 
just as with proving one adheres to certain religious beliefs, courts deal with the issue 
with regularity.175  In each case involving mental disturbance, so long as the trier of 
fact concludes that the parties present sufficient evidence, it considers these 
emotional or mental characteristics part of the plaintiff and the defendant must take 
him as he finds him.176  As one court pointed out when dealing with such a situation, 
“‘guarantee of genuiness’ [sic] might ultimately be found ‘in the circumstances of 
the case.’”177 
2.  Physical Conditions 
The most easily recognized pre-existing conditions involve pre-existing physical 
maladies.178  Back conditions,179 Parkinson’s disease,180 diabetes,181 epilepsy,182 and 
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172Id. 
173See Troppi v. Scarf, 187 N.W.2d 511 (Mich. Ct. App. 1971). 
174Id. at 520. 
175See, e.g., Turner v. Haynie, 607 S.W.2d 86, 87 (Ark. Ct. App. 1980) (stating that 
“appellee was not a ‘strong’ individual at the time of his injury,” and his “previous mental 
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177Id. at 826 (citation omitted). 
17822 AM. JUR. 2D Damages § 239 (2004). 
179Piecynski v. Duffy, 875 F.2d 1331 (7th Cir. 1989); Winn v. Fry, 714 P.2d 269 (Or. Ct. 
App. 1986).  
180Hollie v. Radcliffe, 200 So. 2d 616 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967). 
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brittle bones183 are only a few examples of pre-existing physical conditions that 
courts have found to be aggravated by a defendant’s tortious conduct.  Although 
most of these physical conditions are beyond the control of the plaintiff, obesity 
presents itself as a notable exception. 
Obesity can be a controversial pre-existing physical condition because a plaintiff 
can exercise a significant degree of control over his own bodyweight.  Like plaintiffs 
who make religious medical choices that affect the success of their medical recovery, 
defendants have tried to argue that voluntary actions of the plaintiff led to their 
obesity.  Accordingly, they argue the defendant should not be liable for damages 
caused when the weight of the plaintiff resulted in greater injury than would have 
occurred in a person who was not overweight. 
For example, in Close v. New York,184 the overweight plaintiff had been advised 
by her doctors to lose weight in order to relieve pain she experienced as a result of an 
injury sustained in an accident.185  The court decided it should not reduce her damage 
award even though she failed to lose weight because she was overweight before her 
accident and had not been able to stay on a healthy diet.186  Therefore, although the 
plaintiff may have been able to mitigate her damages by losing weight, the court did 
not require her to do so to receive her full damage award.  Instead, it considered her 
weight to be a pre-existing condition. 
Conversely, in Moctezuma v. Industrial Commission of Arizona,187 the court ruled 
that the claimant was not entitled to worker’s compensation benefits when her doctor 
prescribed a weight reduction program that she did not follow.188  The plaintiff had 
been heavy before her accident, but she gained a significant amount of weight after 
her accident.  In this situation, the court considered weight to be within the 
claimant’s control, as she exhibited the ability to lose weight when she did stick to 
her diet.189  Because the court observed that her weight gain could aggravate the 
severity of her injury, it found that her weight was not a pre-existing condition and 
denied her receipt of benefits.190 
Finally, Lewis v. Insurance Company of North America191 exemplifies both 
obesity and another pre-existing condition within the same plaintiff.  In this case, 
Lewis was injured while working at her job as a cook when she slipped on a piece of 
lettuce.192  Lewis was tremendously overweight when the accident happened, and the 
                                                           
181Nat’l Dairy Prod. Corp. v. Grant, 241 N.E.2d 275 (Ind. Ct. App. 1968). 
182Leak v. United States Rubber Co., 511 P.2d 88 (Wash. Ct. App. 1973). 
183Sansonni v. Jefferson Parish Sch. Bd., 344 So. 2d 42 (La. Ct. App. 1977). 
184Close v. New York, 456 N.Y.S.2d 437 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982). 
185Id. 
186See id. at 439. 
187Moctezuma v. Indus. Comm’n of Ariz., 509 P.2d 227 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1973). 
188Id. at 229. 
189Id. at 228-29. 
190Id. at 229. 
191Lewis v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 322 So. 2d 429 (La. Ct. App. 1975). 
192Id. at 430. 
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defense argued that she continued to gain weight afterwards.193  Physicians who 
examined her injuries “noted that she had a degenerative osteoarthritic condition 
which was most likely dormant before the accident.”194  
While Lewis argued that her injury triggered her previously dormant arthritic 
condition to the extent that she was unable to perform her former duties without 
“substantial pain,” the defendants argued that her increase in weight should bar her 
from recovery under the mitigation of damages doctrine.195  The court found that 
although Lewis's doctor advised her to lose weight, he had never actually prescribed 
her a weight-loss plan.196  In addition, the court was not convinced that weight loss of 
100 pounds, which doctors estimated to be the amount Lewis would have to lose to 
return to her prior health, would be reasonable treatment.197  The court concluded that 
she had “suffered total and permanent disability” and would not be able to return to 
her position as a cook.198  Accordingly, although it did not say so explicitly, the court 
considered both Lewis’s weight and her dormant arthritic condition as pre-existing 
condition because the defendant had to take Lewis as it found her.  As a result, she 
was not required to mitigate her injury by changing her weight. 
These cases did not involve plaintiffs who could not lose weight because of a 
medical condition; instead, they involved plaintiffs who would not lose weight by 
their own inclination.  Although the plaintiffs in Close and Lewis made the voluntary 
choice not to lose weight, the courts in those cases still required the defendant to take 
the plaintiff as it found them.  Moctezuma can be distinguished from these two cases 
because the plaintiff’s significant weight gain after her injury was not a pre-existing 
condition.  
3.  Combination and Other Conditions 
Although courts have normally limited the thin-skull doctrine to cases involving 
mental or physical pre-existing conditions, there are other instances when a 
defendant must take his victim as he finds him.  This concept was put most 
poignantly by the trial court when deciding Williams:199 “The disability of a chief 
executive of a major corporation will call for more damages than that of a minimum-
wage hamburger flipper.”200 
Schafer v. Hoffman201 exemplifies the concept of financial value as an inseparable 
part of the plaintiff.  In this case, Hoffman struck the plaintiff, a pedestrian, with her 
                                                                
193See id. at 430-31. At the time of the trial, plaintiff weighed approximately 250 pounds.  
Id. 
194Id. at 430. 
195See id. at 431. 
196Id. 
197Id. at 431. 
198Id. 
199See Williams v. Bright, 632 N.Y.S.2d 760, 764-67 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995). 
200Id. at 769. 
201Schafer v. Hoffman, 831 P.2d 897, 898 (Colo. 1992). 
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car while driving under the influence of drugs and alcohol.202  Schafer was seriously 
injured, and in her suit for damages, the Colorado Supreme Court had to address 
whether the trial court correctly gave a thin-skull instruction to the jury.203  
The jury instruction in this case actually reflected two pre-existing condition 
scenarios in the facts.  First, the court ruled that Schafer presented testimony at her 
trial that supported the jury finding that pre-existing physical maladies she suffered 
from were aggravated by the accident.204  Second, the court examined Schafer’s 
employment situation and found the trial court’s thin-skull jury instruction again 
acceptable because it encompassed the disadvantage the plaintiff now had in her 
particular job market given her injuries.205  The court reasoned that a defendant must 
take his victim as he finds him, including the chance that his victim, now 
disadvantaged in her specific job market because of her injuries, costs more than an 
unskilled person would to be made whole.206 
Alcoholism poses another challenging examination for courts when a plaintiff 
asserts thin-skull protections for damage awards.  In Pierce v. General Motors Co.,207 
the Michigan Supreme Court struggled with the issue of alcoholism as a pre-existing 
condition.  Pierce argued that harassment at work caused him to drink more than he 
did before his employment, and that stress caused him to develop a debilitating 
nervous disorder.208  The court ultimately decided against the majority of 
jurisdictions209 by ruling that it should not consider alcoholism a pre-existing 
condition.210  In its analysis, the court reasoned that the plaintiff’s alcoholism was 
                                                                
202Id. 
203Id. at 899. 
204Id. at 901. 
205Id. at 902; see also KEETON ET AL., supra note 150, at 292 (stating that “the defendant 
who kills another must take the chances, as to damages for the death, that the other has a large 
income, although the defendant had no reason to expect it”). 
206Schafer v. Hoffman, 815 P.2d 971, 973 (Colo. Ct. App. 1991), aff’d, 831 P.2d 897 
(Colo. 1992).  It is not clear from the facts in either opinion why Schafer would be 
disadvantaged in the job market. The Court of Appeals of Colorado found that she was 
disadvantaged after the accident because of her age and gender; so, it seems likely that she lost 
her former position or had to quit as a result of her injuries and finding a new, comparable 
position would now be difficult for her because of her age and gender.  Id. at 973. 
207Pierce v. Gen. Motors Corp., 504 N.W.2d 648 (Mich. 1993). 
208Id. at 649. 
209See Proyer v. Monsanto Co., 606 So. 2d 1307 (La. Ct. App. 1992) (finding that although 
plaintiff suffered from paranoia, depression, and alcoholic hallucinosis, work stress was the 
primary problem); Hansen v. Weyerhaeuser, 749 P.2d 1183, 1184 (Or. Ct. App. 1988) (stating 
that “[t]reatment for alcoholism would be more compensable if the injury caused it to become 
symptomatic, or caused a preexisting psychological condition to become symptomatic in the 
form of alcoholism”); Adsitt v. Clairmont Water Dist., 717 P.2d 1231, 234 (Or. Ct. App. 
1986) (finding that alcoholism not caused by work stress but “an exacerbation of an 
underlying condition caused by work activities is itself a compensable occupational disease”); 
see, e.g., Elliott v. Midlands Animal Prod., 428 N.W.2d 920 (Neb. 1988); Globe Mach. v. 
Yock, 717 P.2d 1235 (Or. Ct. App. 1986). 
210Pierce, 504 N.W.2d at 653. 
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what triggered the nervous disorder,211 and work stress could not be found to be the 
reason that his alcoholism worsened because “it is not a job or occupation that 
compels alcoholics to consume alcohol; it is the disease from which they suffer.”212 
Vehemently dissenting, Judge Cavanagh pointed out that while the majority 
opinion placed fault for the disease on the plaintiff, the worker’s compensation 
statute under which he brought his case allowed recovery even if the plaintiff was at 
fault or the work stress was not the only cause.213  He was incredulous that the 
majority could ignore the legitimate controversy over “whether alcoholism may be 
caused by hereditary or environmental factors,” and professed that the court should 
refrain from taking sides before there is “overwhelming scientific evidence tending 
to support one view in preference to another.”214  Furthermore, Judge Cavanagh 
explained how the majority opinion ignored the established rule of pre-existing 
conditions: because alcoholism is a disease and if the defendant's negligent conduct 
aggravates the disease, the defendant is liable if the plaintiff’s condition worsens.215  
Because the Worker’s Compensation Review Board made such a finding, he 
concluded that the defendant was clearly not responsible for the entire disease, but 
that it was responsible to the extent that work stress aggravated the disease to the 
point of disability.216 
As these cases exemplify, pre-existing conditions can take on a variety of forms.  
They may manifest themselves through the mind of the plaintiff or through some 
outward physical sign, or both.  In addition, although some conditions may be 
somewhat under the plaintiff’s control, courts will take into consideration the 
surrounding circumstances when deciding whether they exist as a pre-existing 
condition that requires the defendant to take his victim as he finds him. 
B.  Religion as a Pre-Existing Condition: The Body and Belief 
The main purpose of tort damages is to make the plaintiff whole, and the doctrine 
of pre-existing conditions is necessary if the law is to achieve this goal.  
Accordingly, courts recognize all of the discussed conditions as part of the plaintiff 
and require the defendant to take his victim as he finds him.  If courts are willing to 
recognize such conditions as depression, alcoholism, obesity, and profitability as part 
of the plaintiff, all of which are arguably somewhat voluntary, it seems odd that the 
law would not include specific religious beliefs as part of the plaintiff as well.  
While much is still unknown about the brain and how it processes information, 
scientists have made remarkable discoveries in recent years when studying brain 
activity.  Research reveals that the center for religious thoughts can be pinpointed in 
                                                                
211Id.  at 652. The court stated, “[i]t is not work and its attendant stresses that aggravate 
alcoholism; it is alcohol,” and went on to cite a quote in a footnote: “Alcoholics can always 
give a reason why they drink.”  Id. (citing JAMES E. ROYCE, ALCOHOL PROBLEMS AND 
ALCOHOLISM: A COMPREHENSIVE SURVEY 98 (Free Press 1989) (1981). 
212Id.  
213Id. at 654. 
214Id. at 657 n.15. 
215Id. at 655. 
216Id. at 658-60. 
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the brain, and the study of this subject has only scratched the tip of the iceberg of the 
phenomenal machine that is the human brain. 
At Columbia University’s Center for the Study of Science and Religion, Dr. 
Michael Baime, who practices Tibetan Buddhist meditation, worked with Andrew 
Newberg in conducting one of the most interesting studies in this field of 
“neurotheology.”217  Using a SPECT machine218 while Dr. Baime was in a deep 
meditative state, Newberg examined Dr. Baime’s brain activity.219  When Dr. Baime 
felt he was at “the peak of spiritual intensity,” the SPECT image of his brain was 
recorded.220  It revealed a vibrant area of activity in the prefrontal cortex and a lack 
of activity in the superior parietal lobe.  This lobe is responsible for body orientation, 
and without the sensory input necessary for this region to do its job, “the left 
orientation area cannot find any boundary between the self and the world.”221 
Upon repetition with volunteers from another religion, Newberg achieved the 
same results.  Franciscan nuns volunteered for the study, and while in intense prayer, 
the SPECT image showed the same result as Dr. Baime’s brain had shown.222  This 
“biologically based event[] in the brain223 . . . gives the experience a reality that 
psychologists and neuroscientists had long denied it and explains why people 
experience ineffable transcendent events as equally real as seeing a wondrous sunset 
or stubbing their toes.”224 
A researcher at Laurentian University, Michael Persinger, has used 
electromagnets on volunteers to trigger activity in certain regions of the brain.225  By 
creating a weak magnetic field, the temporal lobe can be induced into creating 
sensations in the volunteer that are described as “supernatural or spiritual.”226  
Persinger theorizes that such “mini electrical storms in the temporal lobes” can be 
“triggered by anxiety, personal crisis, lack of oxygen, low blood sugar, and simple 
                                                                
217Sharon Begley & Anne Underwood, Religion and the Brain: In the New Field of 
“Neurotheology,” Scientists Seek the Biological Basis of Spirituality. Is God All in Our 
Heads? NEWSWEEK, May 7, 2001, at 50, available at http://www.templeton.org/brainmind 
emergence/press-newsweek20010507.asp. 
218Id.  SPECT stands for a single photon emission computed tomography machine.  Id.   It 





223Author’s note: this in no way answers the question of whether God exists, much as, 
which came first—the chicken or the egg?  There is obviously no evidence that God is made 
up in the minds of believers or conversely that God makes this event happen in the minds of 
believers.  
224Begley & Underwood, supra note 219 (quoting Andrew Newberg).  
225Id. 
226Id. 
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fatigue.”227  The obvious connection to human experience is that during such times 
many individuals find themselves turning to God. 
Another pioneer in this field, Vilayanur Ramachandran also conducted 
experiments in this area and concluded that one’s religiosity could depend on the 
amount of activity in the temporal lobes, just as the previously described experiments 
did.228  He asserts that because the speech processing area of the brain is in this area, 
significantly increased electrical activity could cause these areas to activate.229  
Because sensory information is suppressed during intense prayer or meditation, as 
Newberg’s experiments revealed, Ramachandran believes one could perceive to hear 
the “voice of God,” as the brain is “more likely to misattribute internally generated 
thoughts to an external source” during this time.230 
Even the physical manifestations of decision-making have been subject to study.  
By recording drastic changes in core personality components of people who suffered 
brain damage, neurologist Dr. Bruce Miller could track the location in the right 
frontal lobe of one’s characteristics such as preferences in food and clothing, as well 
as an individual’s “most basic views, values, beliefs, and principles.”231  
Furthermore, scientists have even been able to locate one’s ability to make decisions 
within “the limbic system including parts of the anterior cingulate gyrus.”232  This 
phenomenal process occurs by the brain connecting “subjective experience with 
specific emotions or goals, enabling one to make choices.”233 
Taking this research one step further, Matthew Alper reported his findings on the 
subject in his book, The “God” Part of the Brain.234  Given the evidence that there is 
a specific region in the brain designed to process spiritual impulses, Alper argues 
that humans are predisposed to develop their “own spiritual identity or what we call 
a religion.”235  With the brain “hardwired” for such development, scientists began to 
inquire into how such development actually occurs.236 
Dean Hamer, a geneticist at the National Cancer Institute at the National 
Institutes of Health, addressed the intriguing issue of nature versus nurture for the 
answer.237  His genetic findings indicate that “spirituality . . . doesn’t result from 
                                                                
227Id. 
228Id. 
229Id. (explaining that this area of the brain is known as Broca’s area). 
230Id. (quoting Richard Bentall). 
231MATTHEW ALPER, THE “GOD” PART OF THE BRAIN: A SCIENTIFIC INTERPRETATION OF 
HUMAN SPIRITUALITY AND GOD 120 (Rogue Press 5th ed. 2001). 
232Id.  This amazing discovery was also accomplished by studying those unfortunate 
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233Id. 
234Id. 
235Id. at 83. 
236See DEAN HAMER, THE GOD GENE: HOW FAITH IS HARDWIRED INTO OUR GENES 39 
(2004). 
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outside influences.”238  By studying twins and siblings, Hamer demonstrated that 
among families where children were raised in the same family environment, each 
individual’s level of “spirituality” varied.239  His studies revealed that although twins 
and siblings raised in the same environment are more likely to be just as religious as 
the others in their family religiosity and spirituality were not the same.240  
Religiousness is a learned behavior, but spirituality “comes from within.”241  Hamer 
identified this specific genetic signature that predisposed its owner to have a greater 
level of spirituality.242  He concluded that, “the content of religious ideas and 
traditions is cultural, whereas the predisposition to believe them may be at least 
partially genetic.”243 
Hamer took this knowledge even further, trying to determine whether individuals 
affiliate with their specific religious group because of their genes or because of their 
environment.244  He studied groups of twins living together at home and groups 
living on their own.245  As the twins grew up and left home, separated from the 
imposition of their parents’ beliefs, Hamer noticed two changes in the twins’ 
religious beliefs.246  First, their environment obviously became more influential than 
when their parental role models closely guided them.247  Second, he observed that it 
was statistically significant in women that “genes seemed to play a role in their 
beliefs.”248  The specific gene somehow predisposes its holder to “radically throw off 
her past and embrace a new tenet of beliefs.”249  Similarly, when Hamer studied 
twins in the hopes of finding a genetic link to “adherence to doctrine and acceptance 
of traditional beliefs,” the evidence was undeniable that “genetic differences . . . 
[and] . . . one’s shared environment . . . both play a significant role.”250 
All of these studies and research positively reflect that religious beliefs can at 
least have some literal “physical presence” in the body or that they can at least 
manifest themselves in the brain as any recoupable mental condition can.  If a court 
would insist that the thin-skull plaintiff doctrine should only be applicable to pre-
                                                                
238Id. at 49. 
239Id. (stating that “[s]pirituality comes from within.  The kernel must be there from the 
start.  It must be part of their genes.”). 
240Id. at 52. 
241Id. 
242Id. at 74.  
243Id. at 171. 
244Id. 
245Id. at 172. 
246Id. at 172-73. 
247HAMER, supra note 236, at 172. 
248Id.  at 173. 
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existing physical conditions, science is clearly on its way to proving that such a link 
exists. 
IV.  POLICY CONSIDERATIONS FOR EXTENDING THE THIN-SKULL DOCTRINE 
Courts should begin to take a hard look at the public policy behind the mitigation 
of damages doctrine.  With cases in our nation’s history such as Montgomery, which 
asserted, “[w]hen considerations of conscience grounded upon religious beliefs are 
involved, the state interest in preserving health pales into insignificance,”251  why 
insist on the public policy considerations behind mitigation of damages that prevent 
constitutional protections from being extended into the private realm?  Religious 
freedom and prevention of waste do not mix under the same heading—it is 
equivalent to trying to patch a round hole with a square peg. 
Religious beliefs should serve as a pre-existing mental state of mind or 
“condition” that qualify believers for exemption from certain medical treatment that 
would otherwise be considered “reasonable,” just as conscientious objectors to war 
are exempt from combative service for their country because of their religious 
beliefs.  The United States Supreme Court has already had to address the delicate 
problem of religious beliefs as part of the plaintiff in these decisions, so it has proven 
it is capable of doing so.  Furthermore, criminal law doctrine has never permitted a 
defendant to escape conviction simply because the victim has certain beliefs.252  
Discrimination against plaintiffs in tort actions needs to cease. 
A.  Pre-Existing Condition Debate 
Without much elaboration, in Williams, the Supreme Court of New York tossed 
aside the trial court’s eloquent opinion on the applicability of the thin-skull doctrine 
as simply, “error.”253  The only thought it gave to this subject was that the doctrine 
was “traditionally limited to a plaintiff’s pre-existing physical condition, mental 
illness, or psychological disability.”254  Similarly, Munn stated that the doctrine did 
not apply because “the principle has been applied only to pre-existing physical 
injuries.” 255  The court also opted to “decline the invitation to extends its scope,” 
even though there was convincing evidence that the plaintiff’s state courts would.256 
                                                                
251See supra Part II.B.2.  See also Montgomery v. Bd. of Ret., 109 Cal. Rptr. 181 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1973). 
252See Beth Linea Carlson, Blood and Judgment: Inconsistencies Between Criminal and 
Civil Courts When Victims Refuse Blood Transfusions, 33 STETSON L. REV. 1067 (2004); see 
also Klinger v. Florida, 816 So. 2d 697, 699 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002) (stating that “[t]he fact 
that [plaintiff] refused a blood transfusion which might have saved his life does not absolve 
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responsibility” when charged with a homicide); North Carolina v. Welch, 521 S.E.2d 266, 268 
(N.C. Ct. App. 1999) (explaining that “[t]o escape responsibility based on an intervening 
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(citation omitted). 
253Williams v. Bright, 658 N.Y.S.2d 910, 913 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997). 
254Id. 
255Munn v. Algee, 924 F.2d 568, 576 (5th Cir. 1991) (emphasis in original).  The court 
cites to Prosser & Keeton on Torts, but this source does not support the court’s assertion that 
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These courts did not fully consider the purpose or the true extent of the pre-
existing condition doctrine.  Instead, the courts waived the plaintiff’s religious 
beliefs aside as a voluntary decision as mundane as what to have for dinner tonight.  
Had the court in Munn or Williams looked to cases like Pierce, the court in either 
case would have seen that the doctrine has been extended to other quasi-voluntary 
actions of a plaintiff.  Even though brain research concludes that we are genetically 
predisposed to make some religious decisions the way we do, there is no doubt that 
all of the brain research in the world will not erase the concept of free will anytime 
soon.  But these courts failed to see how “voluntary” one’s actions are does not act as 
an absolute bar to recovery when thoroughly examining the pre-existing condition 
doctrine. 
Either court would look foolish if it turned its nose at the pre-existing condition 
doctrine in ways it did not recognize.  For example, is it not free will that engages a 
person to spend three grueling years in law school and most of their personal life to 
build a successful partnership in a law firm?  Suppose the landlord of the law firm’s 
office negligently operated the elevator and the doors opened without the 
preoccupied lawyer noticing the shaft gaping before him.  Would these courts 
decrease the lawyer's damages for lost wages when he falls to a career-ending injury, 
simply because the lawyer could have settled for a life as a bartender?  By 
concluding that pre-existing conditions should only be physical, the courts in Munn 
and Williams would seemingly preclude this lawyer from recovering an award from 
the negligent party that would make him whole because his choice to become a 
lawyer required an award for lost wages to be higher than it would have been 
otherwise.  It seems highly unlikely these courts would not take the lawyer as it finds 
him. 
Furthermore, if the courts in Munn and Williams are unwavering in their 
“physical condition” requirement, the scientific research on genetics is a thin rope to 
hold on with, but it is there, nonetheless.  Future research will most likely strengthen 
this “golden thread.”  
B.  Government Recognition of the Conscientious Objector 
Government can recognize that individuals hold religious beliefs that prevent 
them from engaging in certain activities, and it even attempts to discern which of our 
citizens do so.  The Universal Military Training and Service Act “exempts from 
combatant training and service in the armed forces of the United States those persons 
who by reason of their religious training and belief are conscientiously opposed to 
participation in war in any form.”257  It allows courts to consider religious beliefs part 
of the individual—inseparable.  Essentially, the examiner in such a situation 
considers the individual in just the same way a court does when dealing with a 
person with a pre-existing condition. 
United States v. Seeger gave instruction to the examiner that finds himself in the 
unenviable position of determining whether the objector’s belief was “sincere, 
                                                           
the “eggshell skull” doctrine only applies to pre-existing physical injuries.  See KEETON ET AL., 
supra note 150, at 291.   
256Munn, 924 F.2d at 576. Ignoring state law raises a potential civil procedure issue as 
well, but I prefer to leave that topic for another student. 
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honest, and made in good faith.”258  Just as the honesty of any witness in any case 
must be discerned, the Court directed the examiner to look to the circumstances at 
hand to determine if the beliefs a registrant professed were sincerely held.259  In this 
particular case, the sincerity of the applicant was not in question; his record as a 
Roman Catholic, his humanitarian community service activities, and his studies 
provided sufficient evidence.260  The Williams Court balked at the prospect of having 
to make such a decision, claiming that to do so would be impermissible.261  This 
court clearly missed the point that the only inquiry it should have made was into 
whether the plaintiff sincerely held the beliefs upon which she based her acts and 
omissions. 
To illustrate how a court could make such an inquiry, consider a plaintiff like 
Munn.  The plaintiff claims to hold beliefs typical of the Jehovah’s Witness faith.  
The tenets of the Jehovah’s Witness faith are readily discernable from the group’s 
official website, so this plaintiff would have it easy showing a court what he 
believed—it is conveniently available in pre-printed form.  Church membership 
records would likely offer supporting evidence that the plaintiff adhered to these 
beliefs.  Furthermore, as a Jehovah’s Witness, he could present his medical 
emergency card that explains that he does not wish to partake in blood products.  A 
fact-finder could easily take into consideration all of this information to determine 
whether the plaintiff sincerely held the beliefs.  Taking this plaintiff as it finds him, 
with these personal beliefs, the court would hold the defendant liable for the 
plaintiff’s injury because of this pre-existing state.262 
C. Treating Religion as a Pre-Existing Condition Passes Constitutional Muster 
As in Munn and Williams, future cases will inevitably bring a constitutional 
challenge from the defense for violations of the Establishment Clause.  Plaintiffs 
should rest assured that considering religious beliefs as a pre-existing condition will 
pass constitutional muster. 
                                                                
258Id. at 166-67. 
259See id. at 184-85. 
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261See supra Part II.B.1. 
262The case of Friedman v. New York, 282 N.Y.S.2d 858 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. 1967), is a perfect 
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1.  The Ballard Test Met 
By considering religious beliefs as part and parcel of the plaintiff, courts will 
avoid the danger of conflicting testimony about the “correctness” of beliefs.  As in 
Seeger, the proper inquiry will only be into whether the plaintiff is acting in 
compliance with his own personal beliefs and interpretation of religion. 
This investigation is certainly not a question of reasonableness of the plaintiff’s 
beliefs, as Ballard plainly prohibits.263  It is clearly reasonable that one takes actions 
to avoid a loss one sincerely believes to be the greater evil.  The plaintiff still acts 
reasonably, as mitigation of damages requires: he acts given his “condition,” the 
same standard anyone else with a pre-existing condition is held to.264  This rule is in 
accordance with the current rule that what is reasonable is judged by the particular 
circumstances of each case.265 
2.  The Smith and Sherbert Tests Met 
In Smith, the United States Supreme Court determined that the Sherbert test is 
reserved for situations that call for individualized assessment of a plaintiff’s 
conduct.266  Allowing courts to recognize a plaintiff’s religious beliefs as a pre-
existing condition satisfies this mandate.  By providing this protection for all 
religions, even those that are unperceivable to the majority, the pre-existing 
condition doctrine does not offend the Establishment Clause.  
This approach also respects the Free Exercise Clause.  When a court considers a 
plaintiff’s religious beliefs as a pre-existing condition, it must confront whether 
forcing the plaintiff to be responsible for what it normally considers a reasonable 
mitigation tactic imposes a burden on the free exercise of the plaintiff’s rights.  
Montgomery already clearly held that the government’s interest in “preserving the 
life and health of [its] citizens” pales in comparison to its infringement upon First 
Amendment Rights.267  Therefore, considering a plaintiff’s religious beliefs as a pre-
existing condition fits easily in line with Sherbert.  
Considering religious beliefs to be a pre-existing state of the plaintiff poses an 
acceptable solution to the current inconsistencies in the law regarding judgment on 
factually similar cases regardless of the forum in which they are brought—criminal 
or civil, state action or private.  Courts already have the ability to discern the 
sincerity of a person’s beliefs.  Moreover, they also have the tools to do so in a 
fashion that does not offend the Constitution. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The hallowed rights of the First Amendment define America and have made this 
country what it is today.  The current approach to tort damage cases is offensive to 
these rights, for it forces plaintiffs into a situation where they must choose between 
                                                                
263See United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 87 (1944). 
264RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 918 cmt. c (1979). 
2653 DAMAGES IN TORT ACTIONS § 16.02 (2005). 
266See supra Part II.B.  See also Employment Div. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 
U.S. 872, 884 (1990).  
267Montgomery v. Bd. of Ret., 109 Cal. Rptr. 181, 184 (Cal. Ct. App. 1973). 
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their freedom to exercise or coercion into conformity with the majority’s beliefs to 
receive just compensation for their injuries.  Courts have the cases before them.  
They can continue to ignore the tools in their chambers of justice that would end 
religious discrimination in this matter, or they can pick these tools up and put them 
to good use protecting these invaluable rights. 
Considering religious beliefs as a pre-existing condition is not a foolproof 
solution to the discrimination that is evident in the current state of the law, but a 
court faces a degree of uncertainty whenever there are issues of fact to be decided.  
To err on the side that promotes the most protection of religious beliefs is what the 
First Amendment demands of courts because of the importance of the freedoms 
protected therein. 
Because there can be an infinite variety of religious beliefs professed, a system 
must be in place that can handle all possibilities, as not all cases presented to a fact-
finder will entail easily recognizable religions with well-established beliefs.  The 
position asserted by this note merely requires courts to continue doing what they 
have already done in cases like Seeger and Ballard where the Supreme Court had to 
determine whether the defendant sincerely held his religious beliefs.  Moreover, the 
large majority of cases that will continue to present themselves will undoubtedly be 
very similar to those addressed earlier in this note.  Most future cases will not 
involve some obscure religion where the plaintiff represents the entire membership.  
Rather, these cases will involve members of religious sects that profess clear, well-
known beliefs that courts can easily evaluate for their sincerity.  Furthermore, it 
seems unlikely that a plaintiff would allow himself to suffer or even die unless he is 
firmly convicted in his beliefs.  Accordingly, the potential for abuse in these 
situations is very slim. 
Americans highly regard their freedom but “freedom to differ is not limited to 
things that do not matter much.  That would be a mere shadow of freedom.  The test 
of its substance is the right to differ as to things that touch the heart of the existing 
order.”268 
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